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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS DEEMED INCAPABLE TO PROCEED
TO TRIAL: AN EVALUATION OF NORTH CAROLINA'S
STATUTORY SCHEME*
Envision the following scenario: a person known for his easy-
going, friendly disposition withdraws from his previous social circle
and takes less joy in his favorite activities, if he even participates in
them at all. His demeanor changes; within a short time-frame, his
physical appearance becomes dull, and his eyes lose a once-resounding
spark. He is fading away. When asked about this change, he reveals
that he feels overwhelmed. A burden of anxiety and sadness weighs
him down. He is drowning in life, unable to stay above the surface.
The undertow pulls him down, slowly yet forcibly, until barely his
head remains above water.
Now imagine this person is you. How would you combat these
encompassing symptoms of a mental disorder?1 Would you perhaps
try to get someone's attention so that you might be saved? Would you
try to keep your head above water, utilizing any energy that might be
left to kick and paddle in order to prevent sinking even deeper and try
to swim ashore? Or would you just acquiesce to the undertow and
begin to sink further beneath the surface, allowing the burden to bury
you so deep even your eyes cannot see the light above the water line?
More than 22.1%, or 1 out of every 5, Americans who suffer from
a diagnosable mental disorder may be forced to avail themselves of
these alternatives.2 Of the options mentioned above, this Comment
* The author wishes to express gratitude to Dr. Mark Hazelrigg and Dr. John
Wallace for their helpful insight in regard to the issues discussed herein.
1. See American Psychiatric Association, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS xxii (3d ed., rev., Am. Psych. Assn. 1987). A mental disorder is a
clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a
person and that is associated with present distress (a painful symptom), disability
(impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly
increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability or an important loss of freedom.
2. See U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Mental
Health, NIMH Publication No. 01-4584, The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in
1
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focuses on those individuals who grasp someone's attention by yelling
or screaming while wailing away in the water - those individuals who
succeed in getting the attention of the criminal justice system - the
mentally ill who engage in crime and are incapable to stand trial.
We as a nation are beginning to realize that historically there has
been a strong correlation between mental illness and criminal incar-
ceration.3 Many seriously mentally-ill individuals cannot adequately
survive in their communities without the individualized help and treat-
ment administered by hospitals and other health care facilities. 4 How-
ever, when hospitals cannot administer treatment, as a result of such
circumstances as bed shortages or strenuous statutory requirements,
the mentally ill often find themselves in prison due to minor anti-
social, disruptive behavior that is unrelated to their illness.5
The purpose of this Comment is neither to justify this link nor to
encourage reduced responsibility for such criminal defendants.
Rather, it advocates criminal defendants deemed incapable to proceed
to trial receive efficient treatment addressing both their ability to
regain capacity so they may face trial and their ability to rejoin society
as a beneficial member. In order for this goal to be accomplished, the
applicable commitment sections of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes need to be revised and stated more plainly, so that in addition to
the "dangerousness standard," appropriate "need-for-treatment" lan-
guage may be added. Also, government funding needs to be allocated
efficiently to preventative treatment programs so that the mental ill-
ness-criminal incarceration correlation may be better managed and
reduced.
This Comment will first address North Carolina's statute gov-
erning incapacity to proceed to trial. Next, this Comment will turn to
the purpose and need for involuntary commitment, followed by a dis-
cussion of and explanations for the correlation between mental illness
and criminal incarceration. This Comment will then present some
suggestions for statutory revision of the existing North Carolina stat-
ute and will conclude with a brief discussion of funding issues.
America, (Printed Jan. 2001, rev. May 2003). (citing D.A. Regier, W.E. Narrow, D.S.
Rae, The de facto U.S. Mental and Addictive Disorders Service System. ARCH. GEN.
PsYcHIATRY, 50:85-94 (1993)).
3. See Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their
Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. LJ. 157, 160
(2000).
4. See id.
5. See id.
[Vol. 26:41
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DEFENDANT'S "INCAPACITY TO PROCEED"
North Carolina General Statute § 15A-1001(a) expressly prohibits
trying, convicting, sentencing or punishing a criminal defendant "for a
crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to under-
stand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to compre-
hend his own situation in reference to the proceedings or to assist in
his defense in a rational or reasonable manner."6 This statute guaran-
tees that a criminal defendant will not be tried or punished while men-
tally incapacitated, thus ensuring a fair trial.7
This objective of a fair trial supports the public policy in North
Carolina (as well as the rest of the United States) that a mentally-inca-
pable criminal defendant not be tried while in this condition, as such a
situation deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial., North
Carolina's test for capacity to stand trial assesses whether a defendant
possesses capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the
nature of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a
rational manner, and to cooperate with his counsel so that any availa-
ble defense may be exercised.9 The following circumstances and fac-
tors are relevant and may be used to evaluate a defendant's capability
to stand trial: evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant's
demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on capacity to stand
trial. 10 The issue of a defendant's capacity to stand trial may be raised
at any time by the defendant himself, the prosecutor, or the court, sua
sponte." However, the decision to grant a motion for an evaluation of
a defendant's incapacity to stand trial remains within the trial judge's
discretion. 12
Once the issue of the defendant's mental capacity to proceed to
trial has been raised, the court may evaluate whether the defendant
meets the above incapacity criteria. The court makes this determina-
tion either by appointing a medical expert (a qualified physician) to
evaluate the defendant's competency and produce a written report on
his findings13 or holding a hearing to commit the defendant "to a state
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001 (2003).
7. State v. Aytche, 98 N.C. App. 358, 361, 391 S.E.2d 43,45 (1990).
8. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
9. State v. Jackson, 89 N.C. App. 358, 362, 273 S.E.2d 666, 669 (1981).
10. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002 (2003).
12. State v. Gates, 65 N.C. App. 277, 283, 309 S.E.2d 498, 502 (1983).
13. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002(b)(1) (2003); N.C. GEN STAT. § 122C-263(c)
(2003). The physician's examination should include at least an assessment of the
defendant's current and previous mental illness and mental history, dangerousness to
3
Morris: Criminal Defendants Deemed Incapable to Proceed to Trial: An Eval
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2004
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
mental health facility for observation and treatment for a period, not
to exceed 60 days."' 14
If the court opts to turn the defendant over to a qualified physi-
cian to determine capacity to proceed to trial, the physician must com-
plete a statutorily required physical of the defendant.15  After
administering the physical, the physician must produce an examina-
tion report containing the results of the physical and his recommenda-
tions. 16 The physician has three options. I"
First, if the physician determines that the mentally ill defendant' 8
is both capable of safely surviving in the community with supervision
from family or friends and needing additional treatment which he may
not voluntarily seek,19 the physician will recommend outpatient com-
mitment.2 ° In outpatient commitment, the court orders a defendant
into the care of a designated provider for a maximum of 90 days in
order to receive the treatment and supervision necessary to assist in
controlling symptoms of mental illness.2 ' The physician will provide
the defendant with the contact information for the proposed outpa-
self or others, ability to survive safely without inpatient commitment, and his capacity
to make an informed decision concerning treatment.
14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002(b)(2) (2003). This supports the policy
advanced by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana in 1972. The
Court ruled that without a civil commitment order, a state can only hold a criminal
defendant who is incapable to stand trial as long as it is necessary to determine
whether he will regain competency (See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717,
(1972)).
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263 (2003).
16. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d) (2003).
17. See id.
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(21) (2003) (stating that a mentally ill person is
one possessing an illness "which so lessens the capacity of the individual to use self-
control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to
make it necessary or advisable for him to be under treatment, care, supervision,
guidance or control").
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1) (2003).
20. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(27) (2003) (stating that outpatient treatment is
"treatment in an outpatient setting and may include medication, individual or group
therapy, day or partial day programming activities, services and training including
educational and vocational activities, supervision of living arrangements and any
other services prescribed either to alleviate the individual's illness or disability, to
maintain semi-independent functioning, or to prevent further deterioration that may
reasonably be predicted to result in the need for inpatient commitment to a 24-hour
facility").
21. See Virginia Aldige Hiday, Marvin S. Swartz, Jeffrey W. Swanson, Randy
Borum, & H. Ryan Wagner, Impact of Outpatient Commitment on Victimization of People
with Severe Mental Illness, 159 Am. J. PSYcHIATRY 1403 (2002).
[Vol. 26:41
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tient physician or center. 22 Outpatient commitment provides a less-
restrictive alternative to inpatient commitment and is often a helpful
intervention technique for defendants who are not considered danger-
ous, but may possess the propensity to become dangerous.23
Second, if, on the other hand, the qualified physician finds that
the mentally-ill defendant is either dangerous to himself24 or danger-
ous to others,25 and the defendant meets the involuntary commitment
requirements, the physician may recommend inpatient commitment. 26
Inpatient commitment is 24-hour confinement in a facility that allows
the patient to participate in a structured living environment and treat-
ment or rehabilitation. 27 In North Carolina, a finding of dangerous-
ness means the defendant is either unable to properly care for himself,
has attempted or threatened to harm another or has actually harmed
another.28 Under the current statutory scheme, a defendant may only
be involuntarily committed to inpatient care if he is both mentally ill
and dangerous. 29
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1) (2003).
23. See id.
24. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11)(a) (2003) (stating that within the relevant
past, the defendant has acted in such a way as to show that he would be unable,
without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise
available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily
responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or
medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and there is a reasonable
probability of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless
adequate treatment is given pursuant to this Chapter; a showing of behavior that is
grossly irrational, of actions that the individual is unable to control, of behavior that is
grossly inappropriate to the situation, or of other evidence of severely impaired insight
and judgment shall create a prima facie inference that the individual is unable to care
for himself).
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(1 1)(b) (2003) (stating that within the relevant
past, the individual has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious
bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of
serious bodily harm to another or has engaged in extreme destruction of property; and
that there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated. Previous
episodes of dangerousness to others, when applicable, may be considered when
determining reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct; clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence that an individual has committed a homicide in the relevant past
is prima facie evidence of dangerousness to others).
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1003(a) (2003).
27. See Erika F. King, Outpatient Civil Commitment in North Carolina:
Constitutional and Policy Concerns, 58-SPG LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.. 250, 251 (1995).
28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11)(a) and (b) (2003).
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(2) (2003).
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Third, if the physician finds the defendant neither mentally ill nor
dangerous to himself or others, the proceedings will terminate.30 The
defendant will then return to court to stand trial for his pending crimi-
nal charges.
At this point, the court evaluates the findings of the physician or
the results of the trial capacity hearing to determine whether it believes
the defendant truly mentally ill and incapable to proceed to a trial.3 1 If
the court finds the defendant mentally ill and incapable to proceed to
trial, it will either consider the physician's recommendations to make a
ruling on whether involuntary inpatient or outpatient treatment is
most appropriate, or if the court held a hearing in lieu of a physician's
evaluation, it will order a psychiatrist to evaluate the defendant and
take further action to prepare the defendant to stand trial.32
PURPOSE OF AND TEST FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
The primary purpose of involuntary commitment is to protect the
person who, after due process, has been found to be both mentally ill
and imminently dangerous by placing such a person in a more pro-
tected environment where the danger may be minimized and has treat-
ment be facilitated. 33 The two-fold rationale behind North Carolina's
involuntary commitment statute34 allows temporary withdrawal from
society of those individuals deemed dangerous and provides them with
appropriate treatment.35
However, since involuntary inpatient commitment significantly
limits an individual's liberty interests and is the most restrictive form
of treatment, public policy demands both its careful implementation
and its bearing some rational relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed.36 Traditionally, the government maintains a
two-prong obligation to the individual and society. Under the theory
of parens patriae - literally translated as - "the parent of the country" -
the government has a duty to act as a nurturing parent for anyone who
cannot survive safely or properly take care of himself.37 However,
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(3) (2003).
31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1003 (2003).
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1003 (2003).
33. In re Farrow, 41 N.C. App. 680, 681, 255 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1979).
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C (2003).
35. In re Medlin, 59 N.C. App. 33, 36, 295 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1982).
36. See 53 AM. JUR. 2d, Mentally Impaired Persons § 5 (2003).
37. Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their
Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. LJ. 157, 164
(2000).
[Vol. 26:41
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under the second prong, the government possesses a police power to
protect the well-being of society.
38
The individual's liberty interest must be balanced against the
state's interests in providing care to its citizens who are unable,
because of mental illness, to care for themselves, and its police-power
interest in protecting the community from persons who are mentally ill
and dangerous to ensure the individual receives the least restrictive
form of treatment possible.39 Substantive due process requires that
before a person may be involuntarily committed, the state's interests
both in protecting society and the mentally ill individual must be
shown to outweigh the individual's interest in personal liberty. 40
In O'Connor v. Donaldson, the United States Supreme Court fur-
thered this policy notion by establishing precedent preventing the
involuntary commitment of people who were simply mentally ill and
neither dangerous to themselves nor others. The O'Connor Court
ruled unconstitutional involuntary commitment based solely on
mental illness.41 In North Carolina, the trial court is required to find
the defendant both mentally ill and either dangerous to himself or
others before he may be involuntarily committed.42
However, this raises the paramount question of whether requiring
a finding of both mental illness and dangerousness to justify commit-
ment truly signifies the best approach and really results in an unrea-
sonable encroachment on individual liberty. Although this nation has
recognized the fundamental right to freedom from governmental inter-
ference, society recognizes that circumstances may arise that require
the protection of vulnerable individuals and limitation of certain rights
to promote utilitarianism. 43 If an individual, due to mental illness,
lacks the insight to decide whether he needs to seek treatment, what
alternatives does society have to protect its members and the welfare of
the mentally-ill individual?
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717 (1972).
41. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
42. In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 250-251, 271 S.E.2d 72, 76-77 (1980).
43. Steven B. Datlof, The Law of Civil Commitment in Pennsylvania: Towards a
Consistent Interpretation of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 38 DUQ. L. REv.. 1, 4
(1999).
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WHAT HAPPENS TO CRIMINAL CHARGES WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL Is DEEMED
INCAPABLE To PROCEED To TRIAL
If the court orders the defendant into involuntary inpatient com-
mitment, the defendant's criminal charges may be dismissed with leave
by the district attorney.44 A dismissal with leave results in the defen-
dant's case being removed from the docket of the court until either the
defendant becomes capable of proceeding or the prosecutor believes
the defendant will soon be able to proceed. 45 In the interim, the defen-
dant is committed to a psychiatric facility for involuntary inpatient
treatment.46
COURT-ORDERED INVOLUNTARY INPATIENT COMMITMENT
The initial reason for the defendant's hospitalization is his lack of
capacity to proceed. As such, the main purpose of the psychological
treatment sessions as articulated under the law is to determine the
extent of the defendant's mental illness so he may be treated and made
ready to stand trial.47 Unfortunately, the main focus of these sessions
is alleviating the symptoms and not curing the disease - truly dealing
with the defendant's mental illness and helping him become a contrib-
uting, functioning member of society instead of a repeat-criminal
offender.
As a result, these incapable defendants never truly receive long-
term, enduring help for their mental illness and enter a revolving door,
bouncing from short stays at mental hospitals, to prisons, back into
the community to commit another crime and then return to the same
cycle. 48 Hospitals medicate and stabilize defendants, who are then
found capable to proceed. 49 However, when the defendants return to
prison to await trial, they rapidly destabilize and lose capacity again. 0
44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1009 (2003) (stating that although the prosecutor
has removed the defendant's case from the docket, he may bring the changes again
when he determines that the defendant is competent to stand trial; North Carolina
General Statute § 15A-1009 provides that a prosecutor may enter a dismissal with
leave if a defendant is found by the court to be incapable to proceed to trial).
45. See id.
46. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(2)(2003).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1003 (2003).
48. Ann L. Hester, Note, State v. Gravette: Is There Justice for Incompetent
Defendants in North Carolina?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1991) (citing Bruce
Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: As Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a
Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 246 (1987)).
49. See id.
50. See id.
[Vol. 26:41
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Correlation Between Mental Illness and Criminal Incarceration
Numerous severe mental disorders appear to predominate among
the incarcerated mentally ill.51 Schizophrenia5 2 , affective disorders5 3,
and bipolar disorder54 constitute examples of such serious illnesses.55
Studies indicate that the prevalence of severe mental disorders among
inmates is significantly higher than the general population. 56 Accord-
ing to a study conducted by the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
and the Public Citizen's Health Group, more than 1 out of every 14
inmates, or 7.2% of the prison population, suffers from a form of seri-
ous mental illness.
57
As no permanent cure for severe mental disorders exists, the best
form of treatment is symptom control.5 8 Common forms of effective
treatment for symptom control include the use of pharmacologic
agents and psychotherapy. 59 Pharmacologic agents include antip-
sychotic and antidepressant drugs. 60 Antipsychotic drugs are used to
reduce hallucinations and delusions in patients with schizophrenia
and acute mania. 6' Approximately 70% of patients diagnosed with
51. See T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with
Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for a Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283
(1997).
52. See American Psychiatric Association, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 188 (3d ed., rev., Am. Psych. Assn. 1987). Schizophrenia is a
disorder in which there are characteristic disturbances in several of the following
areas: content and form of thought, perception, sense of self, and relationship to the
external world.
53. Id. at 213. Affective disorders are also called mood disorders. They cause a
disturbance of mood, accompanied by a full or partial Manic or Depressive Syndrome
that is not due to any other physical or mental disorder.
54. See American Psychiatric Association Public Information at http://www.psych.
org/public-info/bipolar.cfm. (last visited on Jan. 1, 2003). Bipolar disorder consists of
moods swings that range from intense highs of mania to the depths of depression.
55. Stone, supra note 51, at 283.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing E. Fuller Torrey, et. al., CRIMINALIZING THE ' SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL:
THE ABUSE OF JAILS AND MENTAL HOSPITALS, 13 (1992)).
58. Stone, supra note 51, at 283 (citing E. Fuller Torrey, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA:
A MANUAL FOR FAMILIES, CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS, 175 (3d ed. 1995)).
59. Id. at 305 (citing William T. Carpenter & Robert W. Buchanan, Schizophrenia,
330 NEW. ENG. J. Med. 681, 686-87 (1994)); Michael Gelder et al., CONCISE OXFORD
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, 151, 177 (1994); Torrey, supra note 58, at 190-192.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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schizophrenia experience clear improvement from the use of antip-
sychotic drugs.
6 2
Antidepressant drugs are used by patients with depression or
mood disorders to influence mood.63 Approximately 70% to 80% of
patients With depression or mood disorders who are given antidepres-
sant drugs experience recovery. 64 Psychotherapy is used to relieve dis-
tress and help promote readjustment and modification of long-
standing patterns of maladaptive behavior.6
5
According to a November 6, 2001, article in The News and
Observer, an estimated 80% of North Carolina inmates are either men-
tally ill, have substance-abuse problems, or struggle with both difficul-
ties.66 Further, a Common Sense Foundation special report on North
Carolina's mental health system states that, in 2001 alone, the state
spent an estimated $117 million incarcerating people with mental
illness.67
A 1998 study estimates approximately 43.7% of mentally ill
inmates housed in federal prisons have previously been convicted of a
violent crime, as compared to 21.6% of the general population among
federal prisons.68 In addition, approximately 50% of mentally ill fed-
eral inmates report taking prescribed medication. 69 However, once the
prisoners are released, only approximately 36% continue to take their
medications.70
As can readily be seen from the above-mentioned statistics, psy-
chotherapy and antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs help control
symptoms of a substantial portion of the mentally-ill population. 7' As
a result, providing such preventative treatment as medication and psy-
chotherapy with current government funding may reduce the mental
illness- criminal incarceration correlation.
62. Stone, supra note, 51 at 283. (citing Torrey, supra note 58, 192). However, 25%
percent of patients experience little to no improvement and five percent claim to get
worse.
63. Id. at 305 (citing Gelder, supra note 59, at 337).
64. Id. (citing Robert Michels & Peter M. Marzuk, Progress in Psychiatry, 329 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 628, 628-29 (1993)).
65. Id. (citing Gelder, supra note 59, at 353-54).
66. Sarah Avery, Jail, Dix, Street: A Vicious Circle, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER,
November 6, 2001, at Al (Reporting an interview with Wake County Sheriff John
Baker).
67. See id.
68. Stavis, supra note 3, at 182. (citing Theodore Milton, et al., PSYCHOPATHY:
ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1998)).
69. Id. at 183.
70. Id.
71. Stone, supra note 51, at 305 (citing Gelder, supra note 59, at 353-54).
[Vol. 26:41
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Proposed Explanations For This Mental Illness-Criminal Incarceration
Correlation
Several theories explain the correlation between mental disorders
and criminal incarceration. One theory suggests the funding reduc-
tion for state-run psychiatric facilities and the large spending increases
for correctional facilities have made the transfer of mental health treat-
ment from the civil to the criminal justice setting more common.72 As
a result of decreased funding, state mental health facilities have been
unable to maintain the level of close supervision of the mentally ill and
the administration of their medications that would be desired in order
to promote patients' success in re-adapting to community living.73
In addition, another theory purports the correlation's increase to
have originated because of the failure to establish efficient community
mental health programs to replace the waning institutions. 4 One of
the main reasons attributed to the cause of community programs' fail-
ure is the cessation of medications due to a patient's loss of insight as
a result of his mental illness and need for treatments. 75 A patient's
condition may worsen, and he may engage in erratic behaviors, includ-
ing violence.76 As a result of inefficient community assistance for the
mentally ill, the criminal justice system may intervene upon the com-
munity treatment system's failure.77
An additional noteworthy theory is that of commitment statutes'
focus on "dangerousness" rather than "need-for-treatment." 78 At pre-
sent, under the dangerousness standard requirement of involuntary
commitment, the trial court must find the following three elements
present in order to find the defendant dangerous to others: (1) within
the recent past (2) defendant has (a) inflicted serious bodily harm on
another, or (b) attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or
(c) threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or (d) has
acted in such a manner as to create a substantial risk of seriously bod-
72. Id. at 305 (citing Robert D. Miller, Economic Factors Leading to Diversion of the
Mentally Disordered Offender from the Civil to the Criminal Commitment Systems, 15
INT'LJ. L. PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (1992)).
73. Stavis, supra note 3, at 158.
74. Stone, supra note 51, at 305 (citing Miller, supra note 3, at 185).
75. Stavis, supra note 3, at 185.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 158.
78. See Cameron Quanbeck, Mark Frye, & Lori Altshuler, Mania and the Law in
California: Understanding the Criminalization of the Mentally Ill, 160 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
1245 (uly 2003).
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ily harm to another, and (3) there is a reasonable probability that such
conduct will be repeated.79
PROBLEMS WITH THE ExISTING STATUTORY SCHEME
Problems arise as a result of the dangerousness standard. Proving
all of the elements of dangerousness can be difficult, if not impossible.
It involves qualified physicians to estimate, in their expert opinions,
whether the defendant is likely to engage in future behavior that may
result in the infliction of harm upon himself or upon others. 8° A sec-
ond relevant difficulty is that an individual's dangerousness must be
proven by a "clear and convincing standard.""'
As to the difficulty of proving dangerousness, no concrete, specifi-
cally identifiable standards can be implemented by physicians which
can accurately predict such behavior. As a result, failure to predict
future dangerousness can lead to tragic results. The 2002 North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals case, Gregory v. Kilbride, provides an illustrative
example.8 2
During the 36 hours leading to his evaluation by Dr. Kilbride,
Mark Gregory made numerous threats to kill his wife, Kathryn, and
himself.8 3 Mark's father Lloyd Gregory feared for the safety of his son
and daughter-in-law and petitioned the magistrate for Mark's involun-
tary commitment. Mark was taken into custody and transpqrted to the
Cabarrus County Memorial Hospital where he was evaluated by a psy-
chiatric social worker and an emergency room physician with training
in psychology. Both found Mark met the criteria for involuntary com-
mitment. However, in order to satisfy the statutorily required "two-
physician certification," Mark was taken to Broughton Hospital to be
evaluated by Dr. Kilbride. Dr. Kilbride found that although Mark was
mentally ill, he did not meet the statutorily required definition of dan-
gerousness, subsequently refused to involuntarily commit Mark, and
released him. That same afternoon, Mark fired seven point-blank
range shots, using two different weapons, to kill his wife Kathryn and
then himself.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals instructed in the Gregory
case that a psychiatrist must use "accepted professional judgment, pro-
fessional practice and professional standards of practice exercised by
psychiatrists with similar training and experience situated in the same
79. In re Monroe, 49 N.C. App. 601, 604, 270 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1980).
80. Stavis, supra note 3, at 193.
81. Id.
82. Gregory v. Kilbride, 150 N.C. App. 601, 604, 565 S.E.2d 685, 688 (2002).
83. Id.
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or similar communities."84 Nowhere in either this opinion or the
North Carolina General Statutes does it define appropriate standards
of professionalism or give relevant examples. This leads to an enor-
mous ambiguity that, as witnessed by the Gregory case, can easily lead
to tragic consequences.
Another difficulty arising with the dangerousness standard is the
requirement that the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard be
used. The United States Supreme Court ruled that in order to comport
with the Due Process guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof is required to be
met in civil proceedings brought under state law to involuntarily com-
mit an individual in a state mental hospital. 85 Likewise, North Caro-
lina follows this example by requiring the court to find by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that the defendant is mentally ill and
dangerous to himself or others according to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-
3(1 1)(a) and (b) (2003) to issue an inpatient commitment order.8 6
The "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidentiary standard presents a
greater burden to satisfy than "preponderance of the evidence" but is
not quite as high a threshold as the criminal burden requiring proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt."87 The "clear, cogent and convincing" evi-
dentiary standard "should fully convince. '"88
Furthermore, another difficulty arising under the current statu-
tory scheme of dangerousness is that once the defendant no longer
meets either of the two statutory requirements for involuntary commit-
ment,8 9 he must be released from the mental care facility in accord
with his Due Process right to receive the least restrictive form of treat-
ment necessary.90 As a result, the person no longer receives much-
needed treatment in order to help him readjust to society and stand
trial for his criminal charges. 91 However, by providing a "need-for-
treatment" approach as an alternative to the dangerousness require-
ment of the statute, mental health professionals would be able to pro-
vide medical care to patients who cannot make rational decisions for
84. Id. at 608, 565 S.E.2d at 691.
85. See Debra T. Landis, J.D., Modern Status of Rules as to Standard of Proof
Required in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 97 A.L.R.3d 780, 781 (1980).
86. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268(j) (2003).
87. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 106, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).
88. Williams v. Bldg. and Loan Assn., 207 N.C. 362, 362, 177 S.E. 176, 176-77
(1934).
89. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(2) (2003) (defining mental illness and
dangerousness to self or others).
90. Landis, supra note 85, at 781.
91. Id.
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themselves because of their inability to recognize their mental illness.
A focus on the need for treatment would help put an end to this hospi-
tal recidivism. 92 Hospital recidivism results in substantial human suf-
fering and demoralization, as well as a significant fiscal burden to the
public and private mental hospitals.93
Likewise, jails and prisons are not prepared to provide the mental
health services for the large numbers of mentally ill who have come
under their care. Many correctional facilities lack adequate mental
health resources to effectively provide the treatment needed by persons
with severe mental disorders. 94 As a result of the inadequate treatment
resources, the mental conditions of many inmates worsen and lead to
increased destabilization in mental and physical health.95 Criminal
justice administrators indicate jail programs are not properly equipped
to respond effectively to the needs of mentally ill offenders.96
STATUTORY REVISION SUGGESTIONS
In order to effectively help the mentally ill receive necessary treat-
ment and reduce the mental illness-criminal incarceration correlation,
the North Carolina General Statutes should include a need-for-treat-
ment approach in addition to the current dangerousness requirement.
This would enable physicians to commit individuals who are mentally
ill and EITHER dangerous to themselves or others OR in need of treat-
ment. Five possible additions to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-263(2) (2003)
are suggested as follows, with the proposed language in italics:
1. If the physician or eligible psychologist finds that the respon-
dent is mentally ill and dangerous to self, as defined in G.S. 122C-
3(11)(a), or others, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)(b), OR unable or
refuses to make responsible decisions with respect to voluntary placement
for treatment, the physician or eligible psychologist shall recommend
92. See Cameron Quanbeck, Mark Frye, & Lori Altshuler, Mania and the Law in
California: Understanding the Criminalization of the Mentally Il, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1245 (2003).
93. See Marvin S. Swartz, Jeffrey W. Swanson, H. Ryan Wagner, Barbara J. Burns,
Virginia A. Hiday, & Randy Borum, Can Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce
Hospital Recidivism?: Findings From a Randomized Trial with Severely Mentally Ill
Individuals, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 12 (1999).
94. Stone, supra note 5, at 285 (citing Linda A. Teplin, Psychiatric and Substance
Abuse Disorders Among Male Urban Jail Detainees, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 290, 292
(1994)).
95. Id.
96. Quanbeck, et. al., supra note 78, at 1245.
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inpatient commitment, and shall explain his findings on the examina-
tion report.
9 7
2. If the physician or eligible psychologist finds that the respon-
dent is mentally ill and dangerous to self, as defined in G.S. 122C-
3(11)(a), or others, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)(b), OR unable to
make or communicate rational decisions concerning personal welfare and
lacking the capacity to understand that this is so, the physician or eligi-
ble psychologist shall recommend inpatient commitment, and shall
explain his findings on the examination report.9"
3. If the physician or eligible psychologist finds that the respon-
dent is mentally ill and dangerous to self, as defined in G.S. 122C-
3(11)(a), or others, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)(b), OR is in need of
treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration, predictably result-
ing from inability to make informed decisions concerning treatment, the
physician or eligible psychologist shall recommend inpatient commit-
ment, and shall explain his findings on the examination report.99
4. If the physician or eligible psychologist finds that the respon-
dent is mentally ill and dangerous to self, as defined in G.S. 122C-
3(11)(a), or others, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)(b), OR substantially
unable to make an informed treatment choice and needs treatment to pre-
vent further deterioration, the physician or eligible psychologist shall
recommend inpatient commitment, and shall explain his findings on
the examination report. 100
5. If the physician or eligible psychologist finds that the respon-
dent is mentally ill and dangerous to self, as defined in G.S. 122C-
3(11)(a), or others, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)(b), OR faces a sub-
stantial risk of further destabilization from lack of or refusal to take pre-
97. See FLA. STAT. ANN.. § 394.467(1)(a)(1)(b) (2002). The Florida statute
provides that a person may be involuntarily committed for treatment if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that he is mentally ill and is unable to determine for
himself, because of his mental illness, whether commitment is necessary.
98. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.2(3) (2003). The Hawaii statute provides that a
person may be committed to a psychiatric facility for involuntary hospitalization if the
court finds that the person is in need of care, treatment or both.
99. See Miss. CODE. ANN. § 41-2 1-61(e) (2003). The Mississippi statute provides
that a person is mentally ill if he is in need of treatment in order to prevent further
disability or deterioration.
100. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(1)(a)(2)(e) (2002). The Wisconsin statute
provides that because of mental illness, an individual evidences an incapability to
express an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to
treatment, and thus is unable to make an informed decision.
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scribed psychotropic medications for a diagnosed condition, the physician
or eligible psychologist shall recommend inpatient commitment, and
shall explain his findings on the examination report.1 °1
Statutory Proposals One and Two focus on an individual's inabil-
ity to make a rational, informed decision concerning the need for treat-
ment for his mental illness. The overwhelming advantage of these
proposals is they allow intervention before an individual reaches the
point of dangerousness and comes into contact with the criminal jus-
tice system. However, a visible problem exists with these proposals.
They require society as a whole to agree to protect an individual's lib-
erty interest by intervening to assist him in receiving treatment. As a
result, a mentally-ill individual may not be left to make a treatment
decision on his own.
Statutory Proposals Three, Four and Five focus on preventing an
individual's further deterioration by allowing intervention to maintain
the status quo. The primary focus of these proposals is on outward
manifestations of the mental illness rather than the individual's deci-
sion-making capability for treatment. A potential problem with these
statutory proposals exists in that intervention comes too late, once
outward signs of inner disturbances already appear.
The best statutory scheme for incorporating a need-for-treatment
approach would be to add language regarding inability to make appro-
priate treatment decisions AND preventing further deterioration in
order to encompass a more thorough statute.
COMMITMENT FUNDING ISSUES
Since one of this Comment's proposals focuses on helping to
decrease and more manageably control the mental illness-criminal
incarceration correlation through more efficient allocation of govern-
ment funding, the necessity arises to briefly discuss important fund-
ing issues. The North Carolina General Statutes command state and
local governments to use available resources to provide such core ser-
vices as consultation, prevention, education, and emergency ser-
vices.'0 2 "Available resources" are statutorily defined as state funds,
non-state funds, and other resources that are "appropriated, allocated
101. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-101(a)(ii)(C) (2003). The Wyoming statute
provides that due to mental illness, there is a substantial probability that serious
mental debilitation or destabilization will result from lack of or refusal to take
prescribed psychotropic medications for a diagnosed condition.
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-2 (2003).
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or otherwise made available for mental health."' 0 3 In addition, local
funds are allocated to fund these core services. "Local funds" consti-
tute fees from client payments, Medicare and Medicaid, and fees from
agencies under contract and gifts and donations. 10
4
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-117, all persons admitted to
regional psychiatric hospitals and special care centers are required to
pay the actual cost of their care, treatment, and maintenance. 10 5 This
statutory provision applies to all persons confined within a state insti-
tution, regardless of whether deemed criminally insane or civilly com-
mitted. 10 6 However, no individual may be refused services because of
his inability to pay.'
1 7
The state Secretary of Health and Human Services possesses the
discretion and authority to determine and fix the actual cost of care to
be paid by and for each person admitted to an institution.'0 8 The per-
son admitted to the facility or the person legally responsible for paying
the cost of the admittance is notified of the amount due as soon as the
amount is determined and is further notified via statement on a
monthly basis.' 0 9 If this person is unable to pay the cost by the due
date, the Secretary may arrange for the payment of a portion of the
cost monthly and extend payments until the costs are paid. 110 In addi-
tion, insurance and third-party payment methods are also accepted to
satisfy the cost."'
Although the North Carolina General Statutes detail the commit-
ment payment policies, the failure to conduct transitional planning
and treatment, as well as establish community linkages with defend-
ants who have been found incapable to proceed to trial, not only risks
undermining any mental health treatment that these persons have
received, but almost ensures the defendant with severe mental disor-
ders will decompensate after release, re-offend, and subsequently
revisit the criminal justice system." 2
103. Id.
104. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(20a) (2003).
105. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-117 (2003).
106. State ex rel. Dorothea Dix Hosp. v. Davis, 27 N.C. App. 479, 484, 219 S.E.2d
660, 663-64 (1975), aff'd, 292 N.C. 147, 232 S.E.2d 698 (1977).
107. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-146 (2003).
108. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-118 (2003).
109. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-119(b) (2003).
110. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-119(c) (2003).
111. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-146 (2003).
112. See Ann L. Hester, Note, State v. Gravette: Is There Justice for Incompetent
Defendants in North Carolina?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1991) (citing Bruce
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Taking into consideration the high costs of caring for the mentally
ill in the criminal justice system, it is essential to consider routing
existing funds to prevention and other helpful alternatives. When
mental illness goes untreated, violence and other criminal activities
occur which lead to a person's entering, or re-entering, the criminal
justice system. 113
CONCLUSION
Mentally-ill criminal defendants in North Carolina who are
deemed incapable to proceed to trial currently face a substantial risk
of falling through the cracks, not receiving necessary treatment, and
returning to their communities to re-offend. In order to decrease this
risk, North Carolina desperately needs to expand its involuntary com-
mitment statutes to include a need-for-treatment approach. Further, to
reduce the mental illness-criminal incarceration correlation and to
ensure that mentally-ill defendants receive the help they need, govern-
ment funding must be more efficiently, and effectively, allocated to the
establishment and maintenance of preventative treatment programs.
Jennifer L. Morris
Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: As Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a
Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 243, 246 (1987)).
113. Id.
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